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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1013 
___________ 
 
MARK WALLACE, a/k/a MARK GREEN, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
FEDERAL DETENTION CENTER; TROY LEVI, WARDEN 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-01217) 
District Judge:  Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 3, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 5, 2013 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Mark Wallace, a.k.a. Mark Green, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals 
from the District Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
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I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  On February 5, 2011, while incarcerated at the Federal Detention 
Center (“FDC”) Philadelphia, Wallace participated in a fight with several other inmates 
involving the use of broken, sharpened broomsticks as weapons.  The Bureau of Prisons 
(“BOP”) investigated the fight and issued two incident reports on April 6, 2011, charging 
Wallace with violating FDC Philadelphia’s Code of Conduct.  During the pendency of 
the investigation, Wallace was placed in solitary confinement within the prison’s Special 
Housing Unit (“SHU”).  On April 13, 2011, a Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) 
conducted two separate hearings to address the charges in each report.  According to the 
findings of the DHO, video surveillance recorded Wallace and another inmate 
exchanging blows with broken broomsticks.  Wallace stabbed the other prisoner in the 
eye with a pen or pencil and received numerous lacerations himself.  Ignoring commands 
from a prison officer, Wallace twice entered the cell of another inmate and attempted to 
stab him with the sharpened end of the broken broom handle.  Wallace admitted to being 
involved in the fight, but claimed he was acting in self-defense.  The DOC found that 
Wallace had committed the acts as charged and disallowed 107 days of “good time” 
credits from his sentence.
1
 
                                              
1
 Wallace timely appealed the DHO determinations and the appeal was denied at 
each level. 
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 On March 8, 2012, Wallace filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241, based on six claims that the FDC Philadelphia deprived him of a liberty interest 
without due process of law by revoking his good-time credits without following BOP 
procedures.  He sought to have his good-time credits restored.  The District Court denied 
Wallace’s § 2241 petition and he timely filed this appeal. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  A challenge to a disciplinary 
action resulting in the loss of good conduct time is properly brought pursuant to § 2241, 
“as the action could affect the duration of the petitioner’s sentence.”  Queen v. Miner, 
530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008).  We review the denial of habeas corpus relief de 
novo, exercising plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and applying 
a clearly erroneous standard to its findings of fact.  Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 
314 (3d Cir. 2007). 
III. 
 We agree with the District Court’s denial of Wallace’s § 2241 petition.  A prisoner 
has a liberty interest in good time credits.  Vega, 493 F.3d at 317 n.4.  Thus, when a 
disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of those credits, an inmate must receive 
(1) written notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours prior to any hearing, (2) an 
opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence in his defense, (3) an opportunity to 
receive assistance from an inmate representative, and (4) a written statement of the 
evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 
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U.S. 539, 563-71 (1974).  The Supreme Court has held that “revocation of good time 
does not comport with the minimum requirements of procedural due process unless the 
findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record.”  
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  The Hill standard is minimal and does not require examination of the entire 
record, an independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or even a weighing of 
the evidence.  See Thompson v. Owens, 889 F.2d 500, 502 (3d Cir. 1989).  The relevant 
inquiry is whether “there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion 
reached by the disciplinary board.”  See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. 
Upon review of the record, we agree with the District Court that Wallace was 
afforded due process during the disciplinary proceedings as required by Wolff and Hill.  
First, Wallace alleges that prison officials did not present him with charges within 24 
hours of the conduct in violation of 28 C.F.R. §541.5(a)
2
, which states that a prisoner is 
to “ordinarily receive incident report within 24 hours of staff becoming aware of [his] 
involvement in the incident.”3  Wallace claims that he was presented with notice of the 
                                              
2
 This section was formerly codified at 28 C.F.R. § 541.15(a). 
3
 As the District Court properly noted, this regulation is discretionary, not 
mandatory and prison officials are given wide discretion to adopt and execute their 
policies needed to maintain internal order.  See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 
(1979).  Here, the BOP officials admitted to the delay in producing the incident reports, 
attributing the delay to the need for a lengthy investigation because the incident involved 
several inmates.  We agree with the District Court that the incident required a lengthier 
investigation and conclude that the two month delay was not unreasonable under the 
circumstances. 
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charges against him two months after the fight occurred, in deprivation of due process.  
Wallace also contends that BOP officials violated 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(c),
4
 by not 
conducting a hearing within three days of the alleged conduct. 
However, even if these regulations were violated, Wallace cannot show that his 
right to due process was infringed, where Wolff does not require issuance of the charge 
within 24 hours of the incident or a hearing within three days of the alleged conduct, and 
where any delay did not prejudice him.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377, 381 
(3d Cir. 2003) (holding, in the immigration context, that “there would be no due process 
violation in the absence of prejudice”).  Wolff only requires that an inmate receive 
written notice of the charges 24 hours before a hearing, and here, Wallace was provided 
adequate and proper notice one week prior.  Also, although Wallace has a liberty interest 
in his good time credits, he did not show that the regulations themselves created a liberty 
or property interest such that their violation abridged his due process rights.  See, e.g., 
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995) (holding that the Hawaii prison regulation in 
question did not afford the defendant a protected liberty interest that would entitle him to 
the procedural protections set forth in Wolff).
5
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 This section was formerly codified at 28 C.F.R. § 541.15(b). 
5
 Wallace also claims that BOP officials violated 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(h), previously 
codified at 28 C.F.R. § 541.17(g), by failing to provide him action copies of the DHO’s 
post-hearing report within 24-hours of making a determination.  We agree with the 
District Court that Wallace cannot demonstrate that failure to provide him with the copies 
within 24-hours of making a determination prejudiced him. 
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Finally, Wallace challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at the hearings and 
argues that BOP officials falsified the incident reports in retaliation for a complaint he 
filed against one of them.  However, the record shows that DHO relied on videotaped 
evidence of the fight and eyewitness testimony, which showed Wallace’s participation in 
the fight.  Thus, the DOH findings and the decision to deny Wallace’s good-time credits 
are supported by “some evidence,” in satisfaction of the due process requirements of 
Wolff and Hill.
6
 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
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 Wolff requires that Wallace be afforded the opportunity to call witnesses and 
present documentary evidence during the disciplinary hearing, as well as the opportunity 
to receive assistance from an inmate representative.  Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566-71.  The 
record shows that Wallace declined to call any witnesses or present documentary 
evidence, and that he waived his right to a staff representative.  Wolff also requires that 
Wallace receive a written decision explaining the DOH’s conclusions.  Id., at 564-65.  
The DOH complied with this requirement and, thus, all of the Wolff standards were met. 
